pedant maps what code can do — network access, filesystem operations, crypto, process execution — across Rust, Python, JavaScript/TypeScript, Go, and Bash. It hashes dependency source on every build and alerts when capabilities change. A supply chain attack that adds file_read or env_access to a library is caught before the compromised code runs.
What it catches
A dependency update adds environment variable exfiltration to a library that previously only did HTTP:
$ pedant diff baseline.json current.json
{
"added": [
{"capability": "env_access", "evidence": "std::env::var"},
{"capability": "file_read", "evidence": "std::fs::read_to_string"}
],
"new_capabilities": ["env_access", "file_read"]
}
A build script phones home during compilation. Point pedant at the crate's sources — it discovers build.rs from the crate root itself:
$ pedant gate src
deny: build-script-network — Build scripts should not make network requests
warn: build-script-exec — Build scripts spawning processes is common (cc, pkg-config) but risky
deny: build-script-download-exec — Download-and-execute in build script — classic supply chain attack
Nesting three levels deep in a match arm:
$ pedant check -d 2 src/lib.rs
src/lib.rs:3:17: nested-match: nested match expression, consider tuple matching
src/lib.rs:4:21: max-depth: nesting depth 3 exceeds limit of 2
src/lib.rs:4:21: nested-match: nested match expression, consider tuple matching
Found 3 violation(s)
Quick start
# Install
cargo install pedant
# Scan a project for capabilities — directories are recursed
pedant capabilities src scripts
# Check for suspicious patterns
pedant gate src
# Set up CI supply chain monitoring (see examples/supply-chain-check.md)
Migrating from the old flat flag CLI? See docs/migrating-from-flat-cli.md.
GitHub Actions
Three composite actions. Each builds pedant from the pinned action source — no registry fetch, one trust boundary.
- uses: jostled-org/pedant/.github/actions/pedant-check@<commit> # structure and style
with:
paths: src
- uses: jostled-org/pedant/.github/actions/pedant-gate@<commit> # capability gate rules
with:
paths: src
- uses: jostled-org/pedant/.github/actions/supply-chain-check@<commit>
with:
baseline-path: .pedant/baselines
They default to --format github, so findings arrive as annotations on the pull request rather than log lines. deny fails the step; warn annotates and passes. The same format is available from the CLI:
$ pedant check --format github src
::error file=src/nested.rs,line=4,col=21,title=max-depth::nesting depth 3 exceeds limit of 2
$ pedant gate --format github src
::error title=build-script-download-exec::Download-and-execute in build script — classic supply chain attack
Violations anchor to their source location. Gate verdicts judge a whole capability profile and have no location, so they attach to the run.
CI Supply Chain Check
The included GitHub Action hashes every dependency's source and compares against stored baselines on every build. It detects:
- Tag-swap attacks — same version number, different content (hash mismatch)
- Capability drift — new capabilities appearing in a dependency update
- New unaudited dependencies — dependencies with no existing baseline
# .github/workflows/ci.yml
jobs:
supply-chain:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@11bd71901bbe5b1630ceea73d27597364c9af683 # v4.2.2
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@a54c7afe936fefeb4456b2dd8068152669aa8211 # stable
- uses: jostled-org/pedant/.github/actions/supply-chain-check@<commit> # pin to commit
with:
baseline-path: .pedant/baselines
fail-on: new-dependency
new-dependency fails when a crate enters the tree or gains a capability, but not on a routine version bump — a new or tampered dependency trips CI until you review it and run pedant supply-chain update. hash-mismatch (the action default) only re-checks content that Cargo.lock already verifies, and new-capability misses a wholly-new crate; see examples/supply-chain-check.md for the trade-offs.
Pedant is built from the same pinned commit as the action — no registry fetch, one trust boundary. That example covers setup and baseline management.
Capability Detection
# Rust, Python, JS/TS, Go, Bash — language detected automatically
pedant capabilities src scripts deploy
# Attestation: capability profile + SHA-256 source hash + crate identity
pedant attestation --crate-name my-crate --crate-version 0.1.0 src
# Diff two profiles or attestations
pedant diff old.json new.json
Directories are searched recursively for any file pedant recognizes. Build directories (those carrying CACHEDIR.TAG, as cargo writes into target/), node_modules, and dot-directories are skipped; a file named explicitly is always analyzed.
| Capability | What triggers it |
|---|---|
network |
std::net, reqwest, curl, fetch(), net/http, URL literals |
file_read |
std::fs, open(), os.Open() |
file_write |
std::fs::write, cp, mv, rm |
process_exec |
std::process, subprocess, exec, bash -c |
env_access |
std::env::var, process.env, os.Getenv, export |
unsafe_code |
unsafe blocks, unsafe fn, unsafe impl |
ffi |
extern blocks, ctypes, import "C" |
crypto |
ring, openssl, PEM blocks, hex keys, credential prefixes |
system_time |
SystemTime, chrono, time |
proc_macro |
#[proc_macro], #[proc_macro_derive] |
Gate rules evaluate per language group by default. Use --cross-language to merge all findings for combined evaluation.
See examples/capability-detection.md for the full guide: output format, all 24 gate rules, multi-language details, string literal analysis, attestation, and diffing.
Style Checks (Rust)
32 checks across five categories. Nesting checks run by default. Everything else needs .pedant.toml: most are off until you enable them, while the rule-driven checks (item-visibility-policy, flat-module-family, feature-boundary) are on by default but stay silent until you give them rules.
pedant check src # a directory — pedant recurses it
pedant check src crates # several roots, de-duplicated
pedant check -d 2 src/lib.rs # one file, custom depth limit
pedant list-checks # see all checks
pedant explain max-depth # detailed rationale
Pass directories rather than a ** glob. Recursion happens inside pedant, so every caller gets the same rules; a ** glob depends on your shell (bash needs globstar, and silently matches only one level deep without it).
| Category | Checks |
|---|---|
| Nesting | max-depth, nested-if, if-in-match, nested-match, match-in-if, else-chain |
| Forbidden patterns | forbidden-attribute, forbidden-type, forbidden-call, forbidden-macro, forbidden-else, forbidden-unsafe |
| Performance & dispatch | dyn-return, dyn-param, vec-box-dyn, dyn-field, clone-in-loop, default-hasher |
| Structure (per file) | mixed-concerns, inline-tests, let-underscore-result, high-param-count, long-function-body, module-root-definitions, large-source-file, high-method-count, item-visibility-policy, ungated-test-api |
| Structure (whole project) | conflicting-module-root, flat-module-family, feature-boundary, scattered-inherent-impl |
| Naming | generic-naming |
The project-level checks read the source tree and Cargo metadata rather than a single file, so run them from the workspace root and give them the whole tree — feature-boundary shells out to cargo metadata.
high-method-count spans both rows. Given a whole crate it counts a type's inherent methods across every file, so splitting an impl in two does not duck the ceiling; given one file it counts what that file shows. Aggregation is deliberately conservative — a type name is totalled only when the crate defines it in exactly one place. #[cfg]-gated impls are grouped by predicate and the type is measured against its worst build (everything unconditional plus the single richest alternative), so mutually exclusive platform impls never sum into a phantom god-object, yet a #[cfg(feature = "…")] on a default-on feature cannot hide one either.
Violations carry a severity. deny fails the run; warn is reported but exits 0. Every check denies by default; only checks with an explicit warning tier, like large-source-file, emit warnings.
To run pedant as a Claude Code hook that blocks AI-generated code on every edit:
{
"hooks": {
"PostToolUse": [
{
"matcher": "Write|Edit",
"hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "~/.claude/hooks/pedant-check.sh" }]
}
]
}
}
Semantic Analysis (Rust)
With the semantic feature, pedant resolves types through aliases using rust-analyzer and enables data flow analysis: taint tracking (environment variables flowing to network sinks), quality checks (dead stores, discarded results), performance checks (unnecessary clones, allocation in loops), and concurrency checks (lock guards across await points).
cargo install pedant --features semantic
pedant gate --semantic src/**/*.rs
MCP Server
pedant-mcp exposes analysis as MCP tools for AI agents.
cargo install pedant-mcp
claude mcp add --transport stdio --scope user pedant -- pedant-mcp
Tools: query_capabilities, query_gate_verdicts, query_violations, search_by_capability, explain_finding, audit_crate, find_structural_duplicates.
pedant-snippet
pedant-snippet returns the source declaration enclosing one file location, byte for byte. It serves the same operation as a CLI and as a stdio MCP server. It parses Rust, Python, JavaScript, TypeScript, TSX, Go, and Bash.
cargo install pedant-snippet
claude mcp add --transport stdio --scope user pedant-snippet -- pedant-snippet mcp
The CLI takes the location and the output shape:
pedant-snippet extract --file src/lib.rs --line 42 --column 9 --format text
--column is optional and --format defaults to json. Tool: enclosing_unit.
Configuration
# .pedant.toml
max_depth = 2
forbid_else = true
check_clone_in_loop = true
# Structural checks, off by default — thresholds shown are the shipped defaults
check_long_function_body = true
max_function_body_lines = 120
check_large_source_file = true
source_file_warn_lines = 500 # warn tier: reported, exits 0
source_file_deny_lines = 1000 # deny tier: fails the run
check_high_method_count = true
max_methods = 40
check_module_root_definitions = true
[forbid_calls]
enabled = true
patterns = [".unwrap()", ".expect(*)"]
[gate]
build-script-exec = false # disable a rule
env-access-network = "warn" # override severity
[overrides."tests/**"]
max_depth = 5
[overrides."tests/**".forbid_calls]
enabled = false
Thresholds also have CLI flags (--max-function-body, --max-methods, --max-source-file-lines, --warn-source-file-lines), and passing one enables its check. Every check has a --no-<check> toggle.
Config loads from .pedant.toml (project) or ~/.config/pedant/config.toml (global). Project wins. See examples/ for full configs.
License
MIT or Apache-2.0, at your option.